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I. Transboundary water dispute: origin and
development
The two greatest rivers of the Middle East,
namely the Euphrates and the Tigris, originate
in a particular climatic and topographic zone
and end up in quite a different one. The Eu-
phrates-Tigris (ET) basin is characterised by
high mountains to the north and west and ex-
tensive lowlands in the south and the east.
They begin, scarcely apart from each other, in
a relatively cool and humid zone with the
rugged high mountains of Anatolia, visited by
autumn and spring rains, and winter snows.
From there, the two rivers run separately onto
a wide, flat, hot, and poorly drained plain. They
continue more tranquilly through the plateaus
of northern Syria and Iraq, where they cut deep
beds in rocks so that their courses have re-
mained stable over the millennia. In their middle
courses, they diverge hundreds of kilometres
apart, only to meet again near the end of their
journey and discharge together into the Gulf.1
In conformity with the expert judgments of geo-
graphers, the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers can
be considered as forming one single trans-
boundary watercourse system. They are linked
not only by their natural course when merging at
the Shatt Al-Arab, but also as a result of the man-
made Thartar Canal, which links the Tigris to the
Euphrates through the Thartar Valley in Iraq.2
The waters of the ET basin stand to be signifi-
cant and strategic for the major riparian states:
Iraq derives the majority of its freshwater from
the two rivers. Although the Euphrates basin is
one of seven river basins in Syria, it is strate-
gically the most important one because of
existing and potential uses for agricultural and
hydropower purposes. The ET basin is one of
25 basins in Turkey, but accounts for nearly
one third of the country’s surface water re-
sources and one fifth of its irrigable land.3
The water question emerged on the regional
agenda in the ET basin when the three riparian
states initiated major development projects for
water and land resources. It is only since the
1960s that Turkey and Syria have put forward
ambitious plans to develop the waters of the Eu-
phrates-Tigris river system for energy and irriga-
tion purposes. At the same time, Iraq also an-
nounced new schemes for an extension of its
irrigated area. As the national water develop-
ment ventures progressed, mismatches be-
tween water supply and demand occurred
throughout the river basin. The ad hoc technical
negotiations were unable to prepare the ground
for a comprehensive treaty on equitable and ef-
fective transboundary water management.4
Hence, a series of diplomatic crises occurred in
the region in the last quarter of past century.
Turkey had started impounding the Keban reser-
voir by February 1974, at the same time that
Syria had almost finalised the construction of
Tabqa dam. This was a period of severe drought.
The impounding of both reservoirs escalated into
a crisis in the spring of 1975. Iraq accused Syria
of reducing the river’s flow to intolerable levels,
while Syria placed the blame on Turkey. The
Iraqi government was not satisfied with the Syr-
ian response, and the mounting frustration re-
sulted in mutual threats bringing the parties to
the brink of armed hostility. A war over water
was averted when Saudi Arabia negotiated the
release of extra amounts of water from Syria
to Iraq. In January 1990, Turkey temporarily
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intervened in the flow of the Euphrates river in
order to fill the Atatürk dam reservoir. Even
though Turkey had notified its downstream
neighbours by November 1989 of the pending
event and had sent delegations to Middle East-
ern countries to explain the need for the im-
poundment and the measures taken, the Syrian
and the Iraqi governments officially protested
against Turkey and consequently called for an
agreement to share the waters of the Euphrates
as well as a reduction of the impounding period.
Bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria
have long been uneasy. Two principal sources
of friction between them were: Syria’s extensive
logistical support to the separatist terrorist or-
ganisation PKK; and Syrian irredentist claims to
the province of Hatay. Despite official denials by
Damascus, Syria’s support to subversive actions
against Turkey since the early 1980s has been
widely known and documented. Turkish author-
ities’ frustration with Syria’s unfriendly attitude
reached its peak in October 1998. High-ranking
Turkish military officers and politicians have
made public statements that they wanted Syria
to stop supporting the terrorists immediately. The
Turkish initiative, the implications of which
seemed to be clearly understood in Damascus,
produced results and the Syrian authorities de-
ported the head of the PKK soon after. On 20th
October 1998, a framework security agreement
namely the ‘Adana Accords’ was signed be-
tween the two countries. With this agreement,
Turkey gained an effective instrument to moni-
tor compliance of the Syrian side while Syria
committed itself to not to give any more support
to any groups that would damage the national
interests of Turkey.5 Shortly after signing the
Adana accords, Syria requested the resumption
of the Joint Technical Committee (JTC) meetings
to enable the water issue to be considered.
Hence, while the water dispute in the basin orig-
inated due to the competitive, uncoordinated and
unilateral water development projects of the ri-
parian states, the political linkages established
between transboundary water issues and non-
riparian security issues exacerbated the dis-
agreements over water sharing and allocation.6
In 1987 and 1990 two bilateral protocols – ac-
knowledged by all the riparian states as being
interim agreements – were signed following a
number of high-level meetings of top officials in
the ET basin. In 1987, the Turkish-Syrian Pro-
tocol on Economic Cooperation was the first for-
mal bilateral agreement reached on the Eu-
phrates. Turkey promised a water flow of up to
500 m3 per second, or about 16 km3 per year, at
the Turkish-Syrian border, with the intention of
reaching an agreement with Syria on security
matters.7 On the other hand, the Syrian-Iraqi
water protocol of 1990 designated Syria’s share
of the Euphrates waters as 42 percent and allo-
cated the remaining 58 percent to Iraq as a fixed
annual total percentage.8 However, these bilat-
eral accords have failed to include basic com-
ponents of integrated water resources manage-
ment, namely the exchange of water and land
resources data, water quality management, en-
vironmental protection, and stakeholder en-
gagement. Furthermore, both treaties failed to
address fluctuations in flow, meaning that they
contained no clauses referring to the periods of
drought that occur frequently in the basin and
cause drastic changes in the flow regime that
require urgent adjustment to the use of the
rivers. The water sharing protocols also lack an
effective organisational backup, at least in the
form of joint monitoring of these agreements. 
On the other hand, in the early 1980s, the ET
basin riparian states managed to build an insti-
tutional framework, namely the JTC, whose
members included participants from all three ri-
parians.9 However, they could not succeed in
empowering it with a clear and jointly agreed
5 Kıbaroǧlu and Kıbaroǧlu, Global Security Watch-Turkey: A Reference Handbook, 2009.
6 Kıbaroǧlu, Facing Water Challenges in the Middle East, 2016.
7 Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation Between the Republic of Turkey and the Syrian Arab
Republic, 1987. 
8 law No. 14, 1990.
9 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, 1996.
mandate. The major issues that led to the dead-
lock were related to both the subject and the
object of the JTC negotiations: whether the Eu-
phrates and the Tigris should be considered a
single system, or whether the discussions
should be exclusively limited to the Euphrates.
Iraq and Syria considered the Euphrates an in-
ternational river that should be treated as an in-
tegrated system. Both countries insisted on an
immediate sharing agreement under which the
waters of the Euphrates would be shared on
the basis of each country stating its water
needs. On the other hand, the Turkish position
was that international rivers are only those that
constitute a border between two or more ripar-
ian states, and it considered the Euphrates and
Tigris as a single transboundary river system
which crossed the common political border.10
By the mid-1980s, when the irrigation targets of
the Southeastern Development Project (GAP)
of Turkey had materialised, it was clear to the
downstream riparian states that Turkey would
utilise more water from the Euphrates than from
the Tigris to irrigate the designated fields. This
caused great anxiety in Syria and Iraq, and led
them to claim historical and/or acquired rights to
the Euphrates’ waters, in particular before the ir-
rigation projects within the GAP were fully re-
alised. Syria indicated explicitly during the ne-
gotiations that unlike the Euphrates, which
provided the bulk of its surface water potential
needs, the Tigris was not vital for Syrian uses
as the result of topographical features.11 More-
over, Syria was well aware of the fact that if Iraq
managed to win two thirds of the Euphrates
flow (700 m³/sec) at the end of the negotiations,
Syria would benefit greatly from that flow by
virtue of being the midstream riparian. On the
other hand, Iraq concluded that Turkey and
Syria would not plan to develop the Tigris for
consumptive use, and therefore concentrated
its demands solely on the Euphrates in order to
gain a maximum share of that river.
All in all, the JTC meetings did not make an ef-
fective contribution to the settlement of the trans-
boundary water dispute. And, they did not pro-
vide a platform for delineating the co-riparians’
priorities and needs as a basis for addressing re-
gional water problems. In this respect, water use
patterns and the riparian states’ related legisla-
tion and institutional structures never had a
chance of being discussed at the JTC meetings.
National management and allocation policies
were like black boxes, and water management
practices within the various countries simply
could not be debated during the negotiations.12
II. Challenges for transboundary water
cooperation
Notwithstanding the failures in inter-state water
cooperation, and the shortcomings and loop-
holes in the exiting bilateral water protocols as
well as ineffectiveness of the JTC, the present
overarching challenge in the ET basin is to co-
ordinate water resources management and es-
tablish transboundary water cooperation in the
midst of the current state of affairs. That is to
say, the turmoil in Syria and instability in Iraq,
which have had deep spill-over effects on their
neighbours, demonstrate that while the gene-
sis of the conflicts has a complicated narrative,
water is a part of it. The depletion of lakes and
rivers, the lack of clean water to drink, and the
loss of livelihood of farmers and fishermen de-
pendent on the water resources are integral
parts of these conflicts. With the rising violence
and instability in the region, and with no re-
gional coordination and poor security schemes
along the rivers themselves, violent non-state
actors – namely the so-called Islamic State (IS)
– have been able to use water as both a re-
source and a weapon. Not only have they de-
stroyed water-related infrastructure, such as
pipes, sanitation plants, bridges and cables
connected to water installations, but they have
also used water as an instrument of violence
10 Kıbaroǧlu and ünver, An Institutional Framework for Facilitating Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris River
Basin, 2000.
11 Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Joint Technical Committee, 1990.
12 Kıbaroǧlu and Scheumann, Evolution of Transboundary Politics in the Euphrates-Tigris River System: New
Perspectives and Political Challenges, 2013.
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by deliberately flooding towns, polluting bodies
of water and ruining local economies by dis-
rupting electricity generation and agriculture.13
To illustrate, in 2014, when the group shut
down Fallujah's Nuaimiyah Dam, the subse-
quent flooding destroyed 77 square miles of
Iraqi fields and villages.14 In June 2015, they
closed the Ramadi barrage in Anbar province,
reducing water flows to the famed Iraqi
Marshes and forcing the Arabs living there to
flee. Mosul Dam gave IS control of nearly 20
percent of Iraq's electricity generation while it
was in the group's possession for a few weeks
in August 2014.15 Furthermore, after the civil
war erupted in Syria, IS seized the opportunity
to control territory in the conflicted region by
joining the fight against the Assad regime.16 By
the end of 2012, IS controlled all of the coun-
try’s major dams in Syria, including the Tabqa
Dam, the centrepiece of water management in
Syria.17 The group lost the Tishreen Dam, lo-
cated downstream from Tabqa, in December
2015 after an alliance of rebel forces carried
out major operations in the area, yet it is still
active in the territory on the western bank of the
Euphrates river from Raqqa to Jarablus, on the
border with Turkey.18 At the same time, gov-
ernments and militaries have used similar tac-
tics to combat IS, closing the gates of dams or
attacking water infrastructure under their con-
trol. But IS fighters are not the only ones hurt
by these efforts – the surrounding population
suffers, too. The Syrian government has been
repeatedly accused of withholding water, re-
ducing flows or closing dam gates during its
battles against IS or rebel groups, and it used
the denial of clean water as a coercive tactic
against many suburbs of Damascus thought to
be sympathetic to the rebels. Water contami-
nation is widespread, with disastrous results of
increased deadly water-borne diseases.19
On the other hand, the severe drought in the ET
basin conveys important messages about what
might happen in the region in the future under
the negative impacts of climate change. Projec-
tions indicate substantial reductions in the runoff
of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. According to
a high emissions scenario (SRES A2) simula-
tion, the surface runoff in these basins will de-
crease by 23.5 percent and 28.5 percent for the
Euphrates and Tigris basins respectively by the
end of the present century (these figures are
calculated for the Turkish portions of these
basins).20 The same simulation reveals that
there will be little snow cover in the headwaters
of these rivers in the late 21st century as the in-
crease in regional temperatures will cause pre-
cipitation to fall mostly as rain (not as snow).
Both changes, i.e. runoff reduction and tem-
perature increase, may have important impli-
cations for the future of the basin. There will be
less water available for irrigation, energy pro-
duction, and domestic and industrial use. less
water in the rivers will also increase the stress
on the ecosystems along the rivers. The severe
2008 drought in the basin served as a warning
for what could happen in this area in the future.
Such events, which could be more frequent and
intense in the years to come, could threaten the
water availability and food security, and may
cause conflicts in the region. 
Policy analysts have previously suggested that
the drought played a role in the Syrian unrest,
and researchers have addressed this as well, ar-
guing the drought had a catalytic effect.21 The up-
rising in Syria was in fact triggered by a series of
13 Kıbaroǧlu, Facing Water Challenges in the Middle East, 2016.
14 Vishwanath, The Water Wars Waged by the Islamic State, 2015.
15 Milner, Mosul Dam: Why the battle for water matters in Iraq, 2014 
16 Hashim, The Islamic State: From al-Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate, 2014.
17 Hussein, How IS uses water as weapon of war, 2015.
18 losso, Water as Weapon: IS on the Euphrates and Tigris, 2016.
19 Vishwanath, The Water Wars Waged by the Islamic State, 2015.
20 Bozkurt and Şen, Climate change impacts in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin based on different model and
scenario simulations, 2013.
21 Gleick, Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria, 2014.
contextual factors, including growing poverty
caused by rapid economic liberalisation and the
cancellation of state subsidies after 2005, a
growing rural-urban divide, widespread corrup-
tion, rising unemployment, the effects of a se-
vere drought between 2006 and 2010 and a lack
of political freedom.22 All these elements are con-
nected and have mutually influenced each other,
making it difficult to untangle the importance of
different ‘triggers’ or identify any single one as
the definitive. With all its complex reasons, the
civil war in Syria has caused one of the largest
refugee crises in recent world history. There is
no doubt that increased efforts are needed to ad-
dress not only the pressing humanitarian situa-
tion, but also the root causes of the refugee cri-
sis. An important number of these causes are
found in the nexus between climate change,
water scarcity, poor governance and conflict.
Water scarcity, or stress, is not the only driver of
migration, but there is without question an indi-
rect correlation between climate change, drought
and migration. If unattended by the regional au-
thorities concerned, climate change will aggra-
vate existing social tensions and political insta-
bility, and will likely add further pressures on the
states and regions that are already fragile and
conflict-prone, as noted in the Syria case.
III. Water management as conflict prevention
Throughout the evolution of their transboundary
water policies, the goal pursued by each ripar-
ian has not changed: Turkey has been keen to
determine what is needed and how resources
should be allocated, while Iraq and Syria have
adopted the same line of reasoning, that a shar-
ing agreement should be concluded on the basis
of a declaration of riparian rights. Yet there was
a change in what was done and how it was done
in the basin in the first decade of the 2000s. The
high-level contacts produced a framework for re-
gional cooperation, of which water became an
integral component. In 2008 and 2009, the gov-
ernments of Turkey, Syria and Iraq embarked
upon cooperative foreign policy initiatives. The
political will expressed and sealed at the highest
levels is also reflected in cooperative initiatives
related to transboundary water development and
management in the Euphrates and Tigris region.
In this context, Turkey and Iraq signed the Joint
Political Declaration on the Establishment of the
High-level Strategic Cooperation Council
(HSCC) on 10th July 2008. A similar bilateral
HSCC was created between Turkey and Syria
on 22nd December 2009. The comprehensive
and strategic nature of the HSCCs resulted in
an innovative approach to transboundary water
issues in that the water and diplomatic bureau-
cracies were empowered to draft and sign a se-
ries of protocols – Memoranda of Understand-
ings (MoUs) – addressing problems associated
with water development, management and use.
Broadening the scope of the cooperation
agenda to take in sectors of socio-economic
development, including water, and simultane-
ously fostering a situation of regional interde-
pendence were in fact the main aims underly-
ing the establishment of both the
Turkish-Syrian and Turkish-Iraqi HSCCs. Thus,
one productive approach to the cooperative
development of transboundary waters in the
ET basin should be to take a regional view of
the benefits to be derived from the river basins.
Past experience in the basin shows that when
negotiations focused solely on water sharing,
upstream and downstream differences were
exacerbated, thereby giving greater promi-
nence to water gains and losses. This has reg-
ularly required the riparian states to see water
as more than just a commodity to be divided –
a zero-sum, rights-based view – and to de-
velop a positive-sum, integrative approach that
ensures the equitable allocation not of the
water but of the benefits derived from it. Adding
development opportunities in other sectors
may enlarge the area of possible agreement
and make implementation more manageable.
Intersectorial linkages may offer more oppor-
tunities for the generation of creative solutions,
allowing for greater economic efficiency
through a ‘basket of benefits.’
22 de Châtel, The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian Uprising: Untangling the Triggers
of the Revolution, 2014.
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Among the forty-eight MoUs which were signed
between Turkey and Iraq on 15th October 2009
was one concerning water.23 With this protocol,
the two sides agreed to exchange hydrological
and meteorological information as well as ex-
changing expertise in these fields. Both sides
also emphasised utilisation and management of
regional water resources in an efficient manner.
The MoU identified particular issues requiring
urgent transboundary cooperation, including:
the assessment of water resources, which are
tending to diminish because of increases in
water use and climate change; the assessment
and calibration of existing hydrological measur-
ing stations; the modernisation of existing irri-
gation systems; the prevention of water losses
from domestic water supply systems and provi-
sion of safe water; the construction of water sup-
ply and water treatment facilities in Iraq, with the
participation of Turkish companies; the devel-
opment of mechanisms to solve problems aris-
ing during the dry period; and joint investigation,
planning, and projects for flood protection. It is
interesting to note that rather than arguing over
only their respective water shares, as happened
at past JTC meetings, the Iraqi and Turkish au-
thorities focused on common issues in trans-
boundary water management and use. These
issues are directly related to water development,
use, and management practices at national
level, which have direct effects on transbound-
ary water policies and practices. 
On 23rd and 24th December 2009, Turkey and
Syria signed fifty MoUs at the first meeting of the
HSCC in Damascus, including four which are re-
lated to regional waters, namely the Euphrates,
Tigris and Orontes rivers. Issues of mutual con-
cern – such as pursuing new water development
projects through joint dam-building on the
Orontes and pumping water from the boundary
Tigris river to Syria, as well as drought manage-
ment, efficient management of resources, and
the improvement of water quality – have consti-
tuted the main subjects of these series of water
protocols (MoUs) between Turkey and Syria. To
illustrate, for decades Turkey called for regula-
tion of the waters of the Orontes River, which
often fluctuated, causing severe flooding or
drought in downstream Turkish towns and vil-
lages. However, Syria never agreed to build
water development structures on the border, ar-
guing that the Orontes is a national river. In this
respect, the MoU of December 2009 marked a
major change in Syria’s attitude.24 Already on 6th
February 2011, the Prime Ministers of both coun-
tries celebrated the laying of the foundation
stone of the Friendship Dam, however, con-
struction came to a halt with the Syrian crises,
which started in March of the same year. 
The other two protocols signed by Turkey and
Syria were the first official agreements con-
cluded by the two countries on the protection of
the environment, water quality management,
water efficiency, drought management, and
flood protection with a view toward addressing
the adverse effects of climate change. Unlike
the bilateral protocol concluded in 1987 on
sharing the waters of the Euphrates, these pro-
tocols focused on how the riparian states were
to use, manage, protect, and develop the di-
minishing water resources of the Euphrates
and Tigris rivers.25
However, thorough analyses reveal that the
change, involving various cooperative initiatives,
is more closely and intimately related to the
change in overall political relations, with decisions
being taken at the highest level. It cannot be de-
nied, therefore, that the overarching problem of
deteriorating political relations in the region
23 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of the Environment and Forestry of the Republic of
Turkey and the Ministry of Water Resources of the Republic of Iraq on Water, 2009.
24 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government
of the Syrian Arab Republic for the Construction of a Joint Dam on the Orontes River Under the Name
“Friendship Dam,” 2009.
25 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government
of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Field of Efficient Utilization of Water Resources and Coping with Drought;
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government
of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Field of Remediation of Water Quality, 2009.
has a counter-effect on the development of
transboundary water cooperation. As political will
faded away, particularly in Turkish-Syrian rela-
tions, technocratic and diplomatic bureaucracies
have encountered serious difficulties in imple-
menting the new water MoUs. They are closely
linked to decision-making at the highest level. 
But it should also be noted that since the early
2000s contacts have been made, existing net-
works have been revitalised, and new ones have
been created. Thus a partial institutionalisation
of water cooperation had already begun before
it was abruptly halted in 2011 as overarching bi-
lateral political relations worsened. When it has
a chance to resume, transboundary water coop-
eration should start from a variety of perspec-
tives and issues, which may again provide op-
portunities for regional cooperation.
No matter how bleak the future might look, the
MoUs have clearly demonstrated that coopera-
tion is possible. As soon as the next window of
opportunity opens, the riparian countries will
have to demonstrate the same vision and fore-
sight so as to create new means of cooperation.
In fact, there is no alternative to cooperation. It
would not be baseless to argue that if Turkey,
Iraq and Syria had taken the opportunity to act
while the political conditions were favourable,
they would have found it easier to collectively
tackle the IS advance later on. Bodies of water in
the region could have been managed in a coor-
dinated manner, and thus the collective respon-
sibility of all parties to ensure swift government
reaction to protect water resources and their as-
sociated infrastructure from terrorism could have
been assured. This, in turn, would have better
protected the people and the areas surrounding
the rivers and lakes in the region. Of course, it is
easy to look back and lament actions not taken,
but the point remains that there will be chances
in the future for these countries to work collec-
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